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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The front caption contains all of the parties to the appeal; (however, Pulmonetic Systems, 
Inc., a Delaware Corporation, who manufactured the ventilator at issue in this case, was 
also named as a defendant and was a party to the proceedings before the trial court. 
Pulmonetic settled with Mr. Nguyen, and it is no longer a £arty to this case. 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue I. Mr. Nguyen designated Dr. John Goldenring, a general pediatrician with no 
experience as a critical care attending physician, as his expert witness. Defendants are 
University of Utah Hospitals and clinics, who employed Madeline Witte, M.D. a critical 
care physician with sub-specialties in critical care medicin^ and pulmonary medicine and 
members of Primary Children's Medical Center's staff included in its pediatric intensive 
care unit. Did the trial court properly exclude plaintiffs eicDert because he lacked 
qualifications to establish the applicable standard of care f<|)r different schools of 
medicine? 
Issue II. Dr. Goldenring did not review or understand thelmedical condition of Derek, 
the hospital's policies, or the factors that went into Dr. Wijte's decision to transport 
Derek for a CT scan. Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Eviddnce requires expert testimony 
to be grounded in reliable facts and data in order to be admissible. Were Dr. 
Goldenring's opinions properly excluded under Rule 702 because he lacked the requisite 
factual basis in which to render a reliable opinion that woi|ld assist the trier of fact? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert 
testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Dikeou\v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 947 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Stevensen v. Goodson, 924|P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996). 
Moreover, "[t]he trial court is allowed considerable latitude of discretion in the 
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admissibility of expert testimony, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, this 
court will not reverse." Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996). 
Issue III. A hospital is not required to obtain informed consent to use FDA-approved 
medical devices in the course of treating a patient. Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Witte did not 
obtain informed consent to use the FDA-approved Pulmonetic ventilator in her attempts 
to save Derek Nguyen's life. Did the trial court err in granting defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on plaintiffs informed consent claim. 
Issue IV. Utah law requires intentional outrageous and intolerable conduct for claims of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff failed to allege sufficiently 
intentional or outrageous conduct to support a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress or for an award of punitive damages. Did the trial court properly grant 
summary judgment on plaintiffs claims? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the 
appellate court reviews the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). 
Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment presents a question of law and the 
appellate court grants no deference to the trial courf s legal conclusions and reviews them 
for correctness. See Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d 
356, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
102(2)0). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUSES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
(a) Subject to the limitation in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify theretp in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specified knowledge may serve as the basis for 
expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods underlying the 
testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon 
sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case. 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the 
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of 
facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally 
accepted by the relevant expert community. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff Buu Nguyen (Mr. Nguyen) filed this products liability and medical 
malpractice action alleging the Pulmonetic ventilator was defective and alleging that the 
University of Utah and Primary Children's Medical Center (PCMC) breached the 
standard of care owed to Derek Nguyen (Derek), resulting in his death. Pulmonetic 
settled with Mr. Nguyen and is no longer a party to this action. 
In order to establish the applicable standard of care, breach of that standard, and 
causation, Mr. Nguyen designated Dr. Goldenring as an expert witness. The University 
and PCMC moved to strike Dr. Goldenring's opinions under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Specifically, Dr. Goldenring lacked the qualifications necessary to opine 
about the standards of care applicable to Dr. Witte, a pediatrician with board 
certifications in critical care and pulmonary care, and to the PICU staff of PCMC. In 
addition, Dr. Goldenring lacked the qualifications to offer opinions about a hospital's 
protocols regarding its decision to purchase a new medical device. Moreover, Dr. 
Goldenring's lack of qualifications prevented him from considering and understanding 
the facts that led to the decision to use the Pulmonetic ventilator to transport Derrick for a 
CT scan. After the trial court granted the motion to strike Dr. Goldenring's opinions, 
both parties moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Mr. Nguyen could not 
establish a prima facie case against them without expert testimony. These motions for 
summary judgment were granted, and this appeal followed. 
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Based on the number of claims that Mr. Nguyen h b asserted, he needed expert 
testimony to establish the applicable standard of care for e^ch individual or entity. The 
University of Utah will address the facts and law with respect to Dr. Witte. PCMC will 
address the facts and law with respect to its staff and its protocols for evaluating medical 
devices. Pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appelate Procedure, PCMC adopts 
and incorporates by reference the facts and arguments set fprth in the University of 
Utah's brief. In support of the issues set forth in this brief,! PCMC sets forth the 
following facts: 
Facts 
In 2001, Primary Children's Medical Center was cobsidering two different FDA-
approved transportable ventilators for use in its Life Flight transport program. (R. at 901-
22, 961, 982-83, 1008-09, 1013-14) PCMC was deciding jvhether to purchase a 
Pulmonetic transportable ventilator or a Cross Vent transportable ventilator. (R. at 987) 
For any new medical device, PCMC has a rigorous Clinical Technology Management 
("CTM") process it uses to determine which medical device it will purchase. (R. at 901-
22, 1008-10, 1013-14) Although PCMC independently nerforms an electrical safety 
inspection of medical devices, it relies on the device manufacturer and FDA approval to 
certify the device operates properly. (R. at 1008-10, 1013-^4, 1242, 1914-16, 2026) The 
FDA had approved both ventilators for use in hospitals and hospital transports. 
PCMC has developed its CTM process in order to Evaluate medical devices that it 
is considering for purchase and to ensure a thorough and upoiased evaluation of the 
device. (R. at 901-22, 961, 982-83, 1008-09, 1013-14) Th^ CTM process is broader than 
an initial evaluation of a medical device, and it includes a comprehensive evaluation of a 
device's life cycle. (R. at 1982, 2016, 3232) Indeed, PCMC's committee includes both 
health care providers and non-health care providers, such as clinical engineers and 
finance personnel. (R. at 787, 1983-86, 3241-43, 3249-54) 
Although broad in its scope and purpose, the CTM process does not prescribe 
what medical situations or patients warrant using a particular device or the when its 
physicians or staff may use a particular medical device; rather, the medical professional 
determines, based on the medical needs of a patient, which device needs to be used to 
provide appropriate medical care. (R. at 901-22, 961, 982-84) A patient's attending 
physician, in this case Dr. Witte, is responsible for assessing a patient's condition and 
then ordering the appropriate medical care, which may include the use of a particular 
device. (R. at 987) As Derek's attending physician, Dr. Witte had ultimate responsibility 
for making the decisions regarding his medical care. (R. at 988) 
On November 24, 2001, Derek Nguyen was admitted to the Pediatric Intensive 
Care Unit (PICU) at PCMC with serious injuries from a motor vehicle accident, including 
a fractured skull, a degloving scalp laceration, multi-organ failure, brain injury, and 
lacerations of his intraabdominal organs. (R. at 1000-02) As Derek's attending physician 
at PCMC, Dr. Witte was responsible for making decisions about Derek's treatment and 
care. (R. at 987-88) Dr. Witte, however, is not an employee of IHC Health Services or 
Primary Children's Medical Center. (R. at 981-83) 
Because Derek's condition was not improving, and had in fact worsened, Dr. 
Witte ordered a CT scan to assess Derek's ongoing problems with intracranial 
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hypertension and cerebral profusion pressure. (R. at 987, 991-92, 997) Dr. Witte 
believed that obtaining a CT was critical and that there wai a high likelihood that Derek 
would die if nothing was done to address his deteriorating condition. (R. at 998-99) 
Accordingly, Dr. Witte ordered that the Pulmonetic ventilator be used to transport Derek 
Nguyen to the CT scanner because it offered a pressure control mode of ventilation and 
could deliver the support that Derek required. (R. at 986, 9^5-96) In so doing, Dr. Witte 
was cognizant that the Pulmonetic ventilator was in PCMCj because it was one of two 
ventilators being considered for purchase. (R. at 792) Dr. Witte's decision to use the 
Pulmonetic ventilator, however, was made outside of the 
Pulmonetic ventilator and was based on two emergent ci 
deteriorating condition and her need for more information 
GTM process to access the 
ircumstances: (1) Derek's 
to treat him (R. at 792), and (2) 
at PCMC that was mobile and the Pulmonetic ventilator was the only ventilator available 
could provide a high pressure setting that Derek required. (R. at 792, 986, 995-99) In 
fact, Kevin Crezee, R.R.T., the respiratory therapist who assisted in transporting Derek 
Nguyen, under Dr. Witte's direction, stated that the Pulmonetic ventilator was the only 
available ventilator that could duplicate the respiratory support Derek was receiving at 
bedside during transport. (R. at 1017, 1023) 
Before Derek was transported to the CT scanner, he was placed on the Pulmonetic 
ventilator for approximately an hour to ensure that the ventilator would provide Derek 
with the requisite levels of support. (R. at 984-85, 1003) While Derek was on the 
Pulmonetic ventilator prior to transport, PCMC's staff determined the ventilator was 
providing comparable pressures to sustain Derek and performed blood gas tests to 
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determine the ventilator was providing the desired levels of oxygen saturation. (R. at 984-
85, 1003) Derek was then transported to the CT scan using the Pulmonetic ventilator 
and had a CT scan without incident. On the way back to the PICU, the Pulmonetic 
ventilator unexpectedly shut down, and Kevin Crezee immediately began manual 
ventilation with the resuscitation bag. Attempts to resuscitate Derek failed, and he died 
from multiple organ failure, heart failure, and respiratory failure. (R. at 1022) 
After Derek's death, Pulmonetic investigated the cause of its ventilator's 
unexpected malfunction. (R. at 824-27) The Pulmonetic investigation did not indicate the 
ventilator had been misused by Dr. Witte or PCMC. (R. at 824-27) To the contrary, the 
investigation revealed an unforeseeable product defect in the ventilator, which caused it 
to suddenly short circuit and lose power. (R. at 824-27) 
Mr. Nguyen's Expert Witness, Dr. John Goldenring 
Mr. Nguyen settled his product liability claim against Pulmonetic, and he 
designated Dr. John Goldenring as his expert witness for his medical malpractice claims 
against all remaining defendants in this matter, including the University, PCMC, and 
PCMC's staff. (R. at 1025-29) 
Dr. Goldenring attempted to demonstrate his qualifications as to each defendant 
through his education and experience. Because Dr. Goldenring was Mr. Nguyen's only 
expert witness., Dr. Goldenring was required to demonstrate knowledge and experience in 
the following areas: a critical care attending pediatric physician with the requisite board 
certifications in critical care medicine and pulmonary medicine, a PICU nurse, a PICU 
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respiratory therapist, and a hospital administrator with knowledge of the development and 
implementation of hospital CTM processes. 
After graduating from medical school, Dr. Goldenring completed his residency in 
pediatrics and a fellowship in adolescent medicine, treating patients from ages 9 to 25. 
(R. at 1040-41) Since approximately 1994, Dr. Goldenring primarily worked primarily in 
the capacity of medical director for Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMO") or 
Independent Practice Associations ("IPA"). (R. at 1042-47) Dr. Goldenring testified that 
he has never been a hospital administrator. (R. at 1048) Instead, Dr. Goldenring merely 
interacts with hospital administrators in his capacity as an IflMO or IPA medical director. 
As an HMO and IPA medical director, Dr. Goldenring testified that he maintains 
contracts with hospitals, which includes monitoring hospitals to insure that the hospitals 
are following the policies and procedures required by the l^MO or IPA. (R. at 1048-49) 
In his administrative capacity, however, Dr. Goldeniing has never been involved 
with the evaluation of equipment in a facility like PCMC. (JR. at 1052) Furthermore, Dr. 
Goldenring has never written protocols for clinical technology evaluations in a facility 
similar to PCMC. (R. at 1025) With respect to PCMC's evaluation of transport 
ventilators, Dr. Goldenring acknowledged that he not a ventilator expert and has never 
used the particular Pulmonetic ventilator model that is at ls^ue in this matter. (R. at 1035-
36) 
As to the medical professionals who attended to Der^k while he was in the PICU, 
Dr. Goldenring attempted to establish a requisite level of training and experience. Dr. 
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Goldenring is not board certified in critical care medicine and acknowledges that "it is 
not appropriate for a general pediatrician to take on a really bad case . . . without getting 
lots of help," including help from critical care physicians. (R. at 1034, 1048). In addition, 
Dr. Goldenring also testified that he would defer to a respiratory therapist regarding the 
standard of care applicable to respiratory therapists. (R. at 1059-60) Dr. Goldenring 
testified that he did not know if it was a breach of the standard of care for a respiratory 
therapist to follow Dr. Witte's order to use the Pulmonetic ventilator. (R. at 1058) 
Finally, Dr. Goldenring testified that he is not an expert regarding the standard of care 
applicable to nurses and would defer to a nursing expert regarding the applicable standard 
of care. (R. at 1060) 
Notwithstanding his lack of qualifications, Dr. Goldenring testified that PCMC 
breached the standard of care in its treatment of Derek from an administrative standpoint 
by not following its own policies and procedures. (R. at 1051, 1053) In fact, Dr. 
Goldenring testified to the following regarding the PCMC's alleged breach of the 
applicable standard of care: 
[T]he hospital has protocols and policies and procedure that they 
need to see are enforced and that their employees and/or people 
working at the hospital need to follow. Insofar as they don't, then the 
hospital is also responsible in addition to the people who violate the 
protocols. 
(R. at 1061) Dr. Goldenring's primary criticism was that the Pulmonetic ventilator 
should not be used on critically ill patients because the CTM protocol suggested 
the process should focus on moderately ill patients. Dr. Goldenring testified, 
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however, that he was unaware of any written protocol, policy, or procedure that 
limited the patient population for clinical evaluation to moderately ill, stable 
patients. (R. at 1054-57) In fact, Dr. Goldenring admitted that he had never read 
PCMC's protocol governing the procedure PCMC used to Evaluate the Pulmonetic 
ventilator. (R. at 1053-54) 
Nonetheless, Dr. Goldenring's opinion was that PCMC established its own CTM 
process, and it should be held to this process. (R. at 1053). In so doing, Dr. Goldenring, 
however, was not critical of the process that PCMC had deVeloped. (R. at 1053-54). Dr. 
Goldenring described PCMC's CTM process as "extremely detailed" and "good." (R. at 
1053). In addition, Dr. Goldenring had no criticism of the 0are Derek received prior to 
being transported for a CT scan. (R. at 843) Dr. Goldenring admitted the care provided 
to Derek was excellent, and without it, he likely would hav^ died. (R. at 843) 
Furthermore, with respect to its CTM process, he stated: "IJPCMC] had gone through a 
very good and extensive process and I think it's laudable." (R. at 1054). Finally, Dr. 
Goldenring could not point to any PCMC policies which lirjnited the patient population 
for the Pulmonetic ventilator. (R. at 1054-57) 
The undisputed testimony regarding the decision to ilise the Pulmonetic ventilator 
to transport Derek did not support Dr. Goldenring's opinions that the CTM guidelines 
established the applicable standard of care for Derek's treatment. First, Dr. Witte 
unequivocally testified that her decision to use the ventilato^: was outside of the CTM 
Process. (R. at 792) Dr. Witte consulted with other health cjare providers regarding 
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Derek's treatment and ultimately made the decision that a CT scan was necessary in order 
to get more information to treat Derek. (R. at 794). As Derek's attending physician, Dr. 
Witte had the ultimate authority to decide the appropriate course of treatment. (R. at 794) 
In making this decision, Dr. Witte stated that PCMC has no general policies that prohibit 
using medical devices on certain patients. (R. at 793) It is the attending physician's call 
to determine the course of treatment and what devices are needed to execute that course 
of treatment. (R. at 794) Finally, Dr. Witte understood that the CTM process 
contemplated use of the transportable ventilators on moderately ill children but that 
criteria was established because those are the kinds of patients that the Life Flight team 
would most commonly encounter. (R. at 800) The CTM process did not eliminate 
critically ill children because of some perceived risk to those patients, rather the CTM 
process selected the patient population on whom the device was most likely used. (R. at 
800) 
Procedural Details of Case and Disposition of the case below 
PCMC joins in the University's recitation of the procedural details and 
disposition of the case below. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Dr. Goldenring lacks the necessary qualifications io render a reliable expert 
opinion to establish the standard of care applicable to PCMC and its staff. Because Dr. 
Goldenring lacks the necessary qualifications, his opinionsl fail to comprehend the factual 
predicate for the medical decisions that he criticizes. Dr. 0oldenring admitted he did not 
fully understand Derek's medical condition or how he was trending while in the PICU. 
Indeed, Dr. Goldenring did not really comprehend Derek's [condition in the PICU. 
Instead, Dr. Goldenring admitted that Derek's care up until] the time the decision was 
made to transport him was excellent. 
Because Dr. Goldenring did not review and was incapable of rendering an 
opinion as to whether Derek's medical condition required d CT scan at the point it was 
ordered, Dr. Goldenring seized on PCMC's CTM process to establish the applicable 
standard of care. The CTM process, however, has nothing to do with an attending critical 
care pediatrician's decision to order a CT scan. In fact, the [attending critical care 
pediatrician was aware of the CTM process, but she specifically noted that Derek's care 
was outside of the process. Derek's condition presented PQMC with an emergent 
situation. The critical care attending pediatrician made the decision to transport Derek 
for a CT scan using an FDA-approved transportable ventilator she knew could maintain 
the high levels of support of Derek's required. Due to circumstances beyond any 
person's contemplation, the medical device failed. The CTlll process is not designed to 
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address and indeed does not address Derek's treatment and the attendant medical 
decisions that were made to try to provide the best possible medical treatment for Derek. 
The trial court properly excluded Dr. Goldenring's opinions from this case and 
properly granted all remaining defendants' motions for summary judgment because 
plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The CTM process and guidelines are irrelevant to a determination of whether 
the University or PCMC breached the applicable standards of care in 
treating Derek. 
The undisputed testimony establishes that the Dr. Witte ordered the use of the 
Pulmonetic ventilator outside of the CTM process and based on Derek's acute medical 
needs. Dr. Goldenring offered no opinion that using an FDA-approved medical device to 
treat an emergeny medical condition is not within the applicable standard of care. 
Moreover, Dr. Goldenring lacks the qualifications and factual understanding to establish 
that use of the Pulmonetic ventilator outside of the CTM process was a violation of the 
applicable standards of care. Finally, Dr. Goldenring cannot establish that PCMC's 
medical staff breached the standards of care when they followed the orders of Derek's 
attending physician. 
Dr. Goldenring had no criticism of the care provided to Derek prior to the time he 
was transported for a CT scan. (R. at 843) Dr. Goldenring was critical of the decision to 
transport Derek, and his criticism of Dr. Witte's and PCMC's care of Derek can be boiled 
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down to two basic premises: (1) the need for the CT scan ^t the time it was ordered did 
not outweigh the risks of transporting Derek for the CT sc^n, and (2) it was inappropriate 
to use the Pulmonetic ventilator to transport Derek becausd he was a critically ill patient. 
In order to understand the first issue, an understanding of Derek's medical condition is 
required in order to assess whether Dr. Witte's decision was appropriate under the 
standard of care for a critical care pediatric physician. Thi^ issue is addressed in the 
University's brief and is incorporated by reference into thisl brief. 
The second issue is directly applicable to Dr. Goldeijring's opinion on whether 
PCMC breached the applicable standard of care. Dr. Goldqnring breaks the second issue 
down into two parts: (a) whether the hospital breached a stdndard of care in allowing a 
physician and its staff to deviate from its CTM process, and (b) whether PCMC's staff 
breached the standard of care in failing to object to Dr. Wittje's decision to transport 
Derek for a CT scan. 
Dr. Witte's decision to transport Derek was outside t^ ie CTM process. (R. at 792) 
When asked about whether her decision to use the ventilatoit conformed with the protocol 
for the CTM process, Dr. Witte stated: "It was not being ustd in order to evaluate the 
ventilator, so I did not consider this part of the ventilator evaluation." (R. at 792) When 
pressed further about whether her decision conformed to the| guidelines established for 
the CTM process, Dr. Witte reiterated: "This was - and I m^de this clear to everyone 
involved. We were not evaluating the ventilator. I saw the fact that this child needed to 
go to CT scan, and this ventilator, I had access to it. I was u^ing this ventilator to give 
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me information to help me treat this patient, and it was not in any way an evaluation of 
the ventilator.... So I viewed this as an FDA approved piece of medical equipment that 
was going to help me get information I needed to treat the patient rather than and 
completely separate from a clinical evaluation of the ventilator." (R. at 792) 
Dr. Witte's testimony established that she viewed the necessity of the CT scan as 
critical. Dr. Witte's testimony established that the only means of which she was aware to 
transport Derek for a CT scan was to use the Pulmonetic ventilator. Accordingly, Dr. 
Witte ordered the CT scan and ordered the Pulmonetic ventilator to be used in order to 
transport Derek. Dr. Witte took full responsibility for this decision. Dr. Witte's decision 
was based on Derek's medical needs, and it was not part of the evaluation of the 
Pulmonetic ventilator. 
Dr. Goldenring praised the care Derek received at PCMC prior to being 
transported for a CT scan, and his criticism of PCMC s staff was that the nurse and 
respiratory therapists did not object to Dr. Witte's decision to use the Pulmonetic 
ventilator. Dr. Goldenring's testimony, however, demonstrates that he has no factual 
basis to render an opinion that PCMC or its staff violated the applicable standards of 
care: 
Q: I believe we just talked about Dr. Witte's decision to use 
the LTV 1000 on this particular patient and that it was her 
decision and order to do so. Correct? 
Dr. Goldenring: Yes. And she says that it was her decision. 
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il. . me \ et you are critical <>i the respiratory care team and 
the staff a1 V~;-".»rv Childress for consenting to that order. 
J** Goldenring: Actually, ! don't think that's what I said. 
i he care learn tends to defer to the leader. 1 don't know 
••i.'her the people w\ux because 1 didn ! look at this, 
honest' •** heino the people who were on that day had been 
involved in all these decisions, hink the attending 
physician has a responsibility to know the protocols and to 
know if it's been discussed. It's always the attending 
physician who ha^ to order ^ Nobod\ ehe earn That's the 
rules. So she took responsibility for thai 
.» .. .< breach of the applicable NKM- M-
respiratory team to follow Hut order: 
III", (luldi i" I hat's an interesting question, because if 
they truly knew and had been involved in the process, they 
really should have questioned whether this wals an appropriate 
patient. I don't know. And I haven't seen anything in the 
depositions that really addresses that question, and so I'm nof 
sure how to answer that question because I doti't know a 
number nT f-i. K 
(R. at 10S7-SXH Emphasis added ) 
Dr. Goldenring acknowledged that Dr. Witte was the lonly person who could order 
T . ' • *reover. I )•, * .okiennng testified the staff at PCMC would 
"defer" to the attending nhvsician's decisions Nonetheless. I)i <inldcnnn^1 is t, ii(u\al of 
PCMC's staff for not objecting I P: Wttte's decision. 
D« Goldenring, however, did not know if PCMC had, any | • lh h^ that phii hul J i 
critically ill patient, hke Derek, from being transported with the Pulmonetic ventilator. 
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(R. at 1054-55) Dr. Goldenring was unaware if the PCMC staff on duty at the time of the 
transport was involved in formulating or knowledgeable about any policies concerning 
transporting critically ill children. (R. at 1057-58). Accordingly, Dr. Goldenring 
conceded he did not know if the PCMC staff had breached the applicable standard of care 
because he was unaware of the facts that were necessary to formulate this opinion. 
If this Court determines that Dr. Witte's decision to use the Pulmonetic ventilator 
was outside of the CTM process, Dr. Goldenring's opinions fail, as they are tied to his 
belief that Dr. Witte and PCMC breached the standard of care because they did not 
follow the CTM process and its guidelines. Accordingly, the Court would not need to 
consider the remaining arguments under Rule 702(a) & (b). 
II. Dr. Goldenring lacked sufficient qualifications to establish the applicable 
standard of care for PCMC and its staff. 
In 1985, the Utah Supreme Court formally adopted the rule followed in the 
majority of states which provides: "a practitioner of one school of medicine is not 
competent to testify as an expert in a malpractice action against a practitioner of another 
school." Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985). As set forth in Burton, 
"an expert belonging to one school may competently testify against a member of another 
school once sufficient foundation has been laid to show that the method of treatment -
and hence the standard of care - is common to both schools." Id. 
In Burton, plaintiff designated an ocular plastic surgeon to testify regarding the 
standard of care for a general plastic surgeon who performed ocular surgery on the 
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plaintiff. Because the plaintiff s expert had more skill and'experience than the defendant 
had, the plaintiff argued her surgeoi 1 cc i ild establish tl le stai idai (I of' :are for b : tl 1 
snrpcons. The dial court, however, required the p la in t i f fs expert to lay adequate 
lu'timiiidoti thai llu; simie slandaid of care was applicable 10 aii plastic surgeons who 
performed ocular surgery or that a suroe* r r i 
to have the same level of skill and expertise before performing the su rge i ; . . . ^ 
• . i-r* - J \ : v . a.. 10 the stanUuM. w ' ca re applicable to all plastic 
surgeons regardless oi &kiii. mub , the trial i ouil d e l u d e d llu
 rLiiii(i(f s expetl .SV» ,,/ 
at 248-49. 
Under Burton, the mere fact that an expert witness n;iay h a w mniv si"ill 
experience, or training does not mean thai i more skilled expert can testify as to any 
stnmlnid of n t i r .IMDIU'HMI In huil lh u in : fnovidcii". :-o tnay possess a lower icscl w 
• i-!.. experieiKv. or (raining. In other words, a doctor ^annpi n c i v ^ r * 
appii^aolc standard nf care for a nurse, As Burton requires, an expert must be able to 
den 101 isti ate a stai idai d of cat c is coi i it. i ion t 3 both schc c Is of i i ledicine. 
,• earb aitei isiu <i/.,. <m ^ < »i.<\ clarified that not only must an expert be able 
to testify as to the applicable standard of care, but Ibe evper! mii^l W .iMi lu esl.ihlnli Ibc 
applicable standard o( care m rough the expert ' s own knowledge, training, and 
. V M !<•••;. % Jcrun,.^. , . .. ^ ) . -. i U t a h C t App. 199^" T Dikeoi i, 
the plaintiff designated an expci : i ni-. - s » n i i: le dicii le to testify at oi it tl i- : 
standard of care for a cardiologist. See id. ai 946. After reviewing medical records and 
deposition transcripts, plaintiffs expert stated he had formed an opinion about the 
applicable standard of care and whether defendant had adhered to the standard. See id. at 
947. This Court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of plaintiff s expert stating: "a trial 
court should require a medical expert witness to demonstrate familiarity with the 
applicable standard of care based on more than just a review of the documents in a 
particular case." Id. This Court went on to state: "By definition, an expert is one who 
possesses a significant depth and breadth of knowledge on a given subject. To allow a 
doctor in one specialty, retained as an expert witness, to become an 'expert' on the 
standard of care in a different medical specialty by merely reading and studying the 
documents in a given case invites confusion, error, and a trial fraught with unreliable 
testimony." Id. Accordingly, an expert's opinions must be based on the expert's 
knowledge, skill, and training rather than a review of the case and later formulation of an 
opinion. In other words, an expert's review of the case is to determine whether a 
standard of care was breached based on the expert's pre-existing knowledge of the proper 
standard of care. 
In Boice v. Marble, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the exception that allowed 
an expert to establish the standard of care was the same, regardless of the school of 
medicine. See id., 1999 UT 71,1ffll4-l7, 982 P.2d 565. In Boice, plaintiff designated an 
neurosurgeon to establish the standard of care for post-operative treatment of a patient 
who underwent spinal surgery. The plaintiffs expert testified that the standard of care 
for a patient in post-operative rehabilitation for spinal surgery is the same, regardless of 
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whether the attending pli\ siunii is a neurologist, orthopedist, or physiatrist. See id. at 
TJ15, Thus, plaintiffs neurosurgeon was able (o establish (lie standard of i arc U >i a 
phvMairist with respect to post-operative care. On the other hand, the Court affirmed the 
;a\ uiiced-practice registered nurse who specialized in 
*/i .-.'jiLtative care from tesiilvipo about tb- •- • s .
 t ,les 
post-operative care Sec id ai * 
T :nder Boic c. the Court will allow an expert from one set - J i 
standaid u! care lor another school if the expert can lay an Adequate foundation lor the 
opinions, rypieally the foundation h'ljmtul In invoke the exception - d require the 
expert to have practiced in the school of medicine for at leas,! a po • • i. pi <u I n \ 
See, e.g., Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 11, ^[18, 977 P.2d 119$ (general dentist was able to 
testify about endndnnlirs w In IT one louilli nl dentisl s practice was endodontics and 
expert had substantial education in endodontics). 
Mr. V j m c n tailed v * • , »•
 : *\ auennngas an 
expert regarding the standard of care applicable to PCMC. Although Dr (iuldninnt ' had 
i • i - -••••^ v ••:- •• ;> ...^u.viiiv \w\\\ iMOs and IPAs,j his deposition testimony 
demonstrates that lie was not qualified t» " r ivj-anlmj. the slantlaid el care applicable 
to I*. \ l i in this matter. (R. at 1049) 
Dr. Goldenrmg was not qualified to testify renai'dino I lie slandatd ol caiv 
applicable to POvl(1 ,s administration of its clinical assessments of medical devices. Dr. 
Goldenring had in M hi en in\ \ »l\ K d \\\ establishing protocols for clinical evaluations or 
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testing hospital equipment. (R. at 1052) His administrative role in hospitals was limited 
to working with physicians to maintain contracts and evaluating a hospital's compliance 
with HMO or IPA standards. Because of Dr. Goldenring's lack of expertise in performing 
clinical evaluations, the trial court was correct in refusing to permit him to testify as to 
the standard of care applicable to PCMC. 
Dr. Goldenring was not qualified to testify regarding the standard of care 
applicable to PCMC because he was unfamiliar with the standard of care applicable to 
critical care physicians, respiratory therapists, and nurses. Dr. Goldenring admitted that 
he would defer to these individuals regarding those issues which were the most critical to 
Derek's care. (R. at 1034, 1048, 1059-60) As such, Dr. Goldenring cannot criticize 
PCMC for deferring the care and treatment of Derek, a patient in critical condition, to the 
skill and judgment of its critical care staff. Dr. Goldenring's reliance on PCMC's CTM 
process to establish the applicable standards of care in this case is similar to the opinions 
that this Court excluded in Dikeou. In Dikeou, this Court required the expert to possess 
familiarity with the standard of care based on his own knowledge, experience, and 
training. This Court precluded expert testimony based on a review of materials in the 
case. Dr. Goldenring admitted that he is unfamiliar with the standard of care for PCMC's 
PICU nurses and its respiratory team, Nonetheless, Dr. Goldenring opined that PCMC 
breached the standard of care based on his review of the CTM process and deposition 
testimony discussing the CTM process. As required by Dikeou, Dr. Goldenring must 
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possess SOUK HK1C|M mh-itl I nn\k;iigc about the appli^aDK .>Lwidard ol care, It is not 
sufficient to form an opinion based on review of :in ir»vle\ itm ('' M p» * icess. 
iiiilhcuviniv, I if'ih I \w ivcngni/es thai III i1 iiiipniipci" l<>i a third pari) lo interlere 
patienl-'ph* sician relationship. In Schaerrer v. Stewart^ Plaza Pharmacy, d ni*.! im i 
brougni aciiu.i j^aiUM a pharmacy that filled prescriptions for one-a-day fen-pheiL a 
presenutv ' ' , . . . lu .iii 
Supreme Cou*j ^ *•>: Hiai the pharmacist did not have a duty to warn of the risks 
a- u.a^u A i ,. prcbcnpuon drugs and, thereby, intervene in the physician-patient 
relationship / r ** " n'cogni/eii lhal il r* ibe treating "physician who is 
best situated to neigh the potential risks associated with [treatment] . . . atan 'J l 
possible bciiclils ol | treatment] . . . and the unique needs artd susceptibilities of each 
patient. I he physician lliii'i Li i llic abihh In umtluii* malkal knowledge ana ...ntiing 
with an individualized understanding of the patient's needs." Id at ^J2r. iiic St hac- i 
ii nil I also recognized that n .. *uu\ is placed upon another entity or individual 'o interfere 
with the physician -paiinil ivl ilmiblnp \\ vHtmld " turn 11K eileci ol undermining the 
physician-patient relationship by engendering fear, doubt, and second guessini A, 
-. * o\\. /;,/;l,7uiw/( Mu-icii /wc.,584 Aid 1383,'1386 (Pa. *QC^] 
Similarly, this Court should not recognize a duty thatj requires PCMC and its staff 
to iiileilen; w illi pliysiciitn-palienl relationship ! • *.1C proper!) deferred the decisions 
regarding Derek's care and treatment to Dr. Witir --i.nilii :d ni'iiii :il i .in: pli\ >icKni .111cJ 
should not be expected to interfere or undermine that relationship. • 
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Mr. Nguyen attempts to argue around Dr. Goldenring's lack of qualifications 
regarding Dr. Witte and PCMC's staff by arguing that all defendants breached the 
standard of care for a multi-disciplinary health care team. Specifically, Mr. Nguyen 
argued that Dr. Goldenring was not offering opinions about standards exclusive to any 
one health care specialty, but applicable to all members of a multi-disciplinary PICU 
health-care team. 
Utah law, however, does not allow expert witnesses to lump specialties into one 
group in order to establish a one-size-fits-all standard of care. Moreover, the practice of 
medicine is not a democracy. As Dr. Witte candidly admitted, she was Derek's attending 
physician and had ultimate responsibility for her care. The other members of the multi-
disciplinary health care team followed Dr. Witte's instructions. Accordingly, in order to 
opine as to the standard of care applicable to a particular health care provider, Dr. 
Goldenring must have been familiar with the standard of care applicable to each 
particular health care provider. See, e.g., Boice v. Marble, 982 P.2d at 570; Diekeou v. 
Osborn, 881 P.2d at 946; Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg'I Med. Ctr., 791 P.2d 193 (Utah 
1990). 
Dr. Goldenring however, conceded that he was unfamiliar with the standard of 
care applicable to respiratory care therapists, nurses, and hospital administrators. In fact, 
he deferred to qualified respiratory care therapists and nurses to define the standard of 
care applicable to each of those specialties. Dr. Goldenring could not overcome his 
apparent lack of knowledge about each of these specialties by asserting that, as a general 
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pnlinlrieinn, li ',VII!I H M|>| uiiaicl>' twenty years ago "in a team context with plenty of 
consultants, including intensivists . . ." (R. at I (MS i \«'< onJi!ti»I\, llir-- '». l*)||i1 '-Imiild 
npi.wiu ilw UtJ court's decision to strike Dr. Ciokicarm J a^  an expert witness because 
lac? • * " • - :..,; . . ::. vjuaaiivu to opine as to the standard of care 
applicable to PCMC administration, pcMC resnir.r .. - . . ,.
 : . - . • . U^PQ 
through "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" as required b> Rule /Gz, ol 
the Utah Rulr 
u r , Croldenring's testimony is not based on sufficient facts and will not assist 
the trier of facts, 
i h\ \ ioldenring's testimony would nut jssisi Hit- Inn nil UnA IKUIU.SC In.s testimony 
is not reliably grounded in fact. "Evidence not shown to be reliable cannot, as a n u ^ < 
law, assisl tltr Inn oi* \)w\ U - IIIKICIstand the evidence or to determine the fact in issue 
ami. therefore, K inadmissible." Haupt v Il\u • * i 
. \- ^(uuting;,H/fr v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 397 -398 (Utah 1989)). 
Dr Gokiennng testified that PCMC breached me appucinn: stnndatd ol v .tic I1,, 
mil iullon nig us own protocols, policies, and procedures when 1): Witte used the 
Pulmonetic ventilat = i < '- MUHI'IL^. nowever, testified that he did 
not review PCMC \s policies and i annol identify an1* written p»-ivu , m prnu/duii: - th 
PCKH '" (ailed to lollou. <K at I0:>4-57) In fact, the evidence establishes that PCMC 
j 
followed its policies anu \ • > •» loneritic ventilator to Ramsey 
Worman for certification prior u> using it on
 uii> patient n- ' • - * ! . 
KM2*# i, I "itt)Mi,,l I o I , I 11 As such, this Court should affirm the trial court's decision to 
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strike Dr. Goldenring's testimony because it would not assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to reach a finding of facts at issue. 
In addition to failing to understand or review PCMC's policies, which formed the 
basis for his standard of care opinion, Dr. Goldenring had no understanding of Derek's 
actual medical condition, the trend of Derek's condition while he was at PCMC under Dr. 
Witte's care, or even the medical factors that ultimately led Dr. Witte to order a CT scan. 
Without this basic understanding of hospital policies, the medical issues involved, and 
Derek's medical condition, Dr. Goldenring lack the requisite factual understanding in 
which to offer any opinion that would assist the trier of fact in its determination of 
whether a breach of the standard of care had occurred. 
Specifically, Dr. Goldenring had no criticism of the care provided to Derek prior 
to the decision to transport him for a CT Scan. (R. at 843, 848) Dr. Goldenring admitted 
to not reviewing the medical records regarding Derek's intracranial pressures (ICP) (R. at 
843-44, 853); his cerebral perfusion pressure (CPP) (R. at 846-47, 853); or any 
coagulation problems (R. at 847). In addition, Dr. Goldenring lacked a complete 
understanding of the treatment provided to Derek prior to being transported for the CT 
scan. (R. at 843, 847) Dr. Goldenring understood that Derek required high levels of 
ventilation, but he was unaware of the specifics of the ventilator settings or Derek's level 
of oxygen saturation. (R. at 844) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Dr. Goldenring 
was not aware of Derek's condition before transport or whether Derek's condition was 
declining or improving. (R. at 844, 847-48) 
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'i.v . i; ma; ij.v v Miuiicn in Derek's condition are monitored by 
critical care pli} siciaii^. w u u i a s k ^ i-• - 1.1 uin; nuns are managed by a 
critical care physician, Dr., Goldenring responded: "These days, that is th - ••?i 
^. n . - . . >>.{)\uu *^a is the standard." (R. at 845) 
Noiwifhsumdint* ]us lack OJ « • ^< • . -- * ^ n idition or 
whwthvi i/crek's coi idition was impro\inL 01 declining, Dr. uoldcnnm m m» I ihni I h. 
Witte' - s- v aiisportcii in* a CT Scan was in error because of the 
risks involved with moving a, critically -• • -• ijcnring, however, 
testified that in managing a critically ill patient, the attending critical care physician is 
constants weighing risks and bcndns in determine an appropriate course of treatment. 
(R, al 849-51, 853-54) Dr. Goldenrim: ;u4 ^ appropriate to get 
«^n at some point. (R. at 853-54) Indeed, he testified, i m not sax n.. 
shouldi
 t . ..ican n s d e a r t h s you're going to need that 
if things are not going well at some poini \\w i|in »11«> t i mi , lui putnl " \U ai K;>4) 
While ackn, * '< =i-.,-, .K.... .. appiopi iate hased on weighing risks against 
potential benefits, Dr. Goldenring ignored the medical cunsidnalMiis lh.il iwiiil In 11Ii . 
d;.i -.- :. . j iiic ^uai.ii^dhons to understand whv the decision was made. Absent 
a thorough under^ianu!i - n • ..ah.a* problems Derek's 
deteriorating condition imposed, and why the CT scan was ordnvd Di (inldem mtn 
lacked a laclnal lust* to render an opinion regarding the care rendered by Dr. Witte, 
PCMC, or PCMC's staff. 
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The CTM process was completely irrelevant to the decision to transport Derek for 
a CT scan. Derek was critically ill, and his condition was deteriorating. Absent some 
improvement, Derek was going to die. Dr. Goldenring admitted that he was ignorant of 
each of these critical factors, so he used an irrelevant product evaluation protocol to opine 
that Dr. Witte, PCMC, and PCMCs staff breached the applicable standard of care. Dr. 
Goldenring's testimony is the definition of unreliable, speculative testimony that Rule 
702 is designed to preclude. 
IV. PCMC owed no duty to obtain informed consent from Mr. Nguyen. 
The trial court properly dismissed Mr. Nguyen's claim for failure to obtain 
informed consent. A claim for lack of informed consent is grounded in negligence 
principles. See Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d. 188, 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). To state a 
claim for negligence, a plaintiff must establish "(1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a 
duty, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the breach of duty was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, and (4) that the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries 
or damages." Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, ^ [9, 125 P.3d 906 (citation 
omitted). Therefore, in order to maintain a cause of action for lack of informed consent, a 
plaintiff is required to establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care to 
obtain informed consent. 
The determination of whether a legal duty exists is a purely legal question that 
falls to the court. See Yazdv. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283. The 
vast majority of courts refuse to impose a duty to obtain informed consent upon a 
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' • •• -
l
 - : . Anthony tiosp Sys., 738 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. Cl. App. 1987) 
(holding thai u.~ hospital duc^ " i" oh.iiii informed consent similar to that 
which the surgeon is obligated to obtain). Instead, the duty to obtain mf< »nu< il < on< i i, 
saw< -I •
 L physicians who have actively! managed the patient's care." 
Johnson v SPiirs, Roebuck 6c Co., yr % '" - -• ; titoiJiiig that the 
treating physician is in the best position to obtain inlbrmed consent fo * t). 
In Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co . a non omplouv physician oulered that the 
hospital nurses give the patient a blood transfusion. See id, 832 P.2d at 798. The patienl 
later developed henahir v, In. h, WA,^ H.H ill to the Dlood transtlision... The patient's estate 
sued the hospital for failure to obtain informed conscnl |» M M l< I gi\ my die blood 
.' h. --i. .\ . .he trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a 
claim for which relief could ("» .t'juiikil against the hospital.. The New Mexico Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding Ihiil Ihe hospilal did nni ha\'c duty to 
( ;* . : , ,ii.ci;. »iiiku consent for a procccluR ordered by a non-eipp!'^ cc rh\ vi -. 
and performed h\ . •. — , . ^ •. • . ,t. '-• . In refusing to place a duty to 
obtain informed consent on. the hospital, the court ddcntiMici! Unit iillendiny physicians 
are i i lore qualified than hospital staff to obtain informed consent. The court's ruling, 
thereby, protected the physieiim-patient relahoirdup I mm unnecessary third-party 
interference. 
rhe Utah Supreme Couu i le physician-patient 
relationship from third-party interference. InSchaerrer v. Stewart's Plara Phaniuicw 
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Inc., the plaintiff experienced nausea, chest pains, and dizziness after taking an off-label 
prescription of fenfloramine and phentermine (or "fen-phen") for weight loss, as 
prescribed by her treating physician. Plaintiff filed a complaint against several 
defendants including her pharmacist claiming strict products liability. The trial court 
dismissed plaintiffs claims on motions for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling and specifically held that 
pharmacists are exempt from strict products liability for failure to warn of the risks of 
prescription drugs. Id. at ^[20-21. Under the learned intermediary doctrine, the court 
held that 
The physician is the best situated to weigh the potential risks 
associated with a prescription drug against the possible 
benefits of the drug and the unique needs of the patient. The 
physician thus has the ability to combine medical knowledge 
and training with an individualized understanding of the 
patient's needs, and is the best conduit for any warnings that 
are deemed necessary. 
Id, at f21 (citations omitted). The court also recognized that if the court placed a duty 
upon pharmacists to warn patients of the potential risks of prescription drugs it would 
"have the effect of undermining the physician-patient relationship by engendering fear, 
doubt, and second-guessing.... Physicians are health care specialists trained to act as 
'exclusive intermediaries' in the drug distribution system." Id. at f21 (citations omitted). 
Similarly, this Court should follow the precedent set by the Utah Supreme Court 
and the majority of courts to protect the physician-patient relationship by recognizing that 
PCMC had no duty to obtain informed consent for treatment prescribed by non-employee 
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physi." :« " icknowiedges that the treating physician is "best situated 
to wemh the potential risL>... the possible K "< , . . n I (I u unique needs of the 
patient. hi at [^20. By plac'..jj a dun to obtain iniurmed consent on third narj • -
PcM( \ this _ physician-patient relationship by engendering 
fear, doubt, and second guessing.'' la. .i\ * 1. 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs claims 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. 
a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Disti ess. 
A plainffff alleging mli'uiion.ii nidiction ot emotional distress must establish 
facts on the record showing the defendant's alh-r* 4 • • igeou^ t...w 
. ,- «.-K:^R ^-nuurman v. Shingleton, 2001. UT 52, f24, 2|6 P.3d 227,. Essentia IK 
liability exists ' «xvou in J utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community." Retherfordv. Al '&TCommc'ns, 844 V V n 
(v|n> .!>. Ki s i i rEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cnu ^. !voi>;. The determination of 
whether condinl is "niiiragcntis"' is a question o* ia- lor the Court to decide. See 
Schuurman, 2001 IJT 52 at ^ 24. 
Utah courts have hisloi it/itlh IKYII w an ol". ipening the door to recovery for 
emotional, distress claims because of their "highly subjective fiiiu ' 
Fro> -' ' • ' • • • - .,v.s.;,. ^ tui^i of LMiur-Day Saints. 2001 11 f 25. «25.21 P.3d 
198. Accordingly, to establish a eliiim loi iiilenlion in wi ^motional distress, it is 
not enough for a plaintiff to show that the defendant intentionally 
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causes distress, defendant's conduct must also be "outrageous." Id. atf25. Plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the defendant: 
(1) intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff 
considered outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality, (2) 
with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress or where any 
reasonable person would have known that such would result, 
and (3) that severe emotional distress resulted as a direct 
result of the defendant's conduct. 
Russell v. Thompson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992) (citations 
omitted). 
Dismissal of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is proper if 
"the alleged conduct of the defendant does not rise to the level of outrageousness as 
required under Utah law." Boisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795, 801 (D. 
Utah 1988). It is the court's duty to decide "'whether the defendants' conduct may 
reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.'" 
Schuurman, 2001 UT 52 at ^24 (quoting Gygi v. Storch, 503 P.2d 449, 450 (Utah 1972), 
also quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h (1948)). 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, for conduct to be considered outrageous, 
c
"[t]he conduct must evoke outrage or revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable, 
unkind, or unfair.' ... 'An act is not necessarily outrageous merely because it is tortuous, 
injurious, or malicious, or because it would give rise to punitive damages, or because it is 
illegal.'" Franco, 2001 UT 25 at f25 (quoting 86 C.J.S. Torts § 72, at 722-23); see also 
32 
H\ si i i »<\n - • -- . * :\-, -. ->65). Furthermore. '"T^he km only 
\ CIKN where the distress inilieled ib ^ ^ . •-•: could be 
expected to endure it' and that T " k nn :he conn io determine whether, on the evidence 
sevc". <* s : ;» .,jnuurman, _»)Ol UT 52 at f24, 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOR I'S $ 40 • ml i (I'M N 11. 
Under Utah law, .i phii'iiitl itiiisi establish outrageous conduct and severe 
emotional distress. In Covert v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 461 - • - *• i 
plaint il I "«. husband was buried under 40 tons of ore while doing some repair work in a 
"feeder comp -" **• -»^ AVL\C\ C averts5 body, Kennecott 
activated the conveyor which moves ore through the conipafiiiH • • •' •* 
>.-'• ; • - madiiiiery was started and Mr. Co\ ert was extracted from the oiv in 
that fashion. See id. nt 468 Tin IMmnliir ".UK upsil lli.il kennecott would further 
mutilate the deceased's body in this manner. See id. at 467. Ihr n "'"I IM ' dismissed 'In 
plaintiffs claim for emotional distress, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. See id. at 
)7u. 
..;.-• . N . -J 1 ^82 (Utali Ct. App. 1995), the plaintiff 
claimed intentional inllietion of emotional ' ^ . ^ . tiir t his emplos ci, alleging that the 
a, i . . u^noiing him, terminating him, and requiring him to discuss his drug adJ* 
with his •lUhnrdinaU''. caused Imii u» sutler extreme humiliation and anxiety. Affirming 
summary judgment for the defendant, m I : e\ ery employee 
who believes he has a legitimate grievance concerning his discharge from empK ^ • 
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experiences some emotional anguish as a result of that belief... .The mere fact that 
Robertson was discharged, coupled with the fact that he was purportedly required to 
discuss his drug addiction with his subordinates, does not rise to the level of 
outrageousness or intolerable conduct necessary to establish a prima facie claim of 
emotional distress." Id. at 1389. 
In Schuurman v. Shingleton, a former patient brought an action against her 
psychotherapist for medical malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
See id,, 2001 UT 52 at ^3. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant carried on a "dual 
relationship" with the plaintiff consisting of a therapist-patient relationship and a personal 
relationship. See id. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant manipulated and controlled 
the plaintiff by making false promises of marriage and financial security. See id. The 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant's actions ultimately destroyed the plaintiffs marriage, 
caused her not to seek proper treatment for her eating disorder and depression, and 
caused severe pain, suffering, and emotional distress. See id. The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the plaintiffs claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress because "[hjowever unpleasant, the emotional 
distress that plaintiff alleges she suffered is indistinguishable from that commonly 
suffered by others when an intimate personal relationship fails. As such, it is not the type 
of emotional distress on which a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress may 
be based." See id., at [^24. 
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These cases held as a matter of law that actions such as mutilating a dead body, 
violating a psychotherapist-patient relationship, demoting ^n employee and discrediting 
his reputation, and failing to provide informed consent before treating a patient with 
experimental drugs were not "outrageous" as required for i claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The Schuurman case show$ that evidence of depression, 
eating disorders, pain, suffering, and distress are not the type ot emotional distress on 
which a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress can be based. 
In this case, the facts alleged against PCMC even ^hen viewed in a light most 
favorable to Mr. Nguyen. PCMC's alleged intentional conduct did not meet the standard 
of "outrageous" conduct required by Utah law to sustain a claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. Mr. Nguyen alleged that PCMC "failed to properly inspect, test, 
and/or certify the Pulmonetics ventilator prior to its use," "decided to use its critically-ill 
patients, or allow others to use the critically-ill patients at its medical center, to test 
and/or demonstrate a Pulmonetics ventilator," and failed to lhlorm him of either of these 
facts. The trial court correctly concluded that this alleged conduct is not sufficiently 
outrageous to sustain the claim for intentional infliction of erhotional distress, especially 
considering that the Pulmonetics ventilator is FDA approved land that Dr. Witte's use of 
the ventilator was not a part of the hospital's clinical evaluatibn of the ventilator. In fact, 
Mr. Nguyen could not produce any evidence to show that anc^  defendants' intent was to 
cause him emotional distress as opposed to an intent only to s^ve Derek's life. 
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b. Punitive Damages. 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on Mr. Nguyen's claims for 
punitive damages. Punitive damages may only be awarded against PCMC upon a 
showing (1) by clear and convincing evidence (2) that PCMC engaged in fraudulent 
conduct that was either "willful and malicious" or conduct manifesting both a "knowing 
and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of others." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-18-l(l)(a). Both the plain language of the Punitive Damages Act and its legislative 
history make clear that punitive damages are available in Utah only in exceptional cases 
involving culpable conduct on the part of the alleged tortfeasor—and then only upon a 
finding supported by clear and convincing evidence. See id. In addition, case law on 
punitive damages in Utah, both prior and subsequent to the enactment of the Punitive 
Damages Act, permits and award of punitive damages only where such an award serves a 
societal interest in deterring outrageous and malicious conduct that is not likely to be 
deterred by an other means. 
The Act's combined requirements of a high degree of wrongful conduct and 
knowledge by a tortfeasor of the wrongful and harmful nature of such conduct were 
specifically crafted to reflect the Utah legislature's belief that only truly culpable conduct 
should be punished. The Legislature drafted the Act in plain terms to make clear that 
even reckless conduct, by itself, does not warrant the imposition of punitive damages. 
Because only truly culpable conduct should be punished, knowing conduct is required. 
See Kia Hodgson, Recent Developments in Utah—Punitive Damages Act, 1990 Utah L. 
Rev. 119, 273 (citing remarks by Senator Haven J. Barlow, 48th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess., 
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Feb.l, 1989 (Sen. Recording No. 43), and Feb. 2, 1989 (Sen. Recording No. 45)). Utah 
appellate courts have also repeatedly cautioned that "punitive damages are not intended 
as additional compensation to a plaintiff [and] must, if awarded, serve a societal interest 
of punishing and deterring outrageous and malicious condUct which is not likely to be 
deterred by other means." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 
1983)). 
"Simple negligence will never suffice as a basis upon which [punitive] damages 
may be awarded." Id. at 1186. Accordingly, '"[p]unitive datoages are not awarded for 
mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and the like, wnich constitute ordinary 
negligence.'" Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 908 Comment b, at 465 
(1979)); see also Boyette v. L. W. Looney & Son, 932 F. Supp. 1344 (D. Utah 1996) 
(holding award of punitive damages may not be based solely upon finding of ordinary 
negligence). In addition, notice or knowledge of a dangerous condition and failure to act, 
absent more, does not support a claim for punitive damages lender Utah's punitive 
damages statute. See Orr v. Brigham Young Univ., 960 F. SUpp. 1522, 1531 (D. Utah 
1994). A defendant (1) "must either know or should know 'that such conduct would, in a 
high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to another,' and [(2)] the conduct 
must be 'highly unreasonable conduct, or an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a 
situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.'" Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1187 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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Finally, in order to limit the availability of punitive damages and to ensure that 
such damages are awarded only in rare and exceptional instances of particularly 
egregious conduct, the Utah Legislature raised the required burden of proof. Any 
punitive damages award must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, rather than 
a preponderance of the evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-l(l)(a). Accordingly, 
when evaluating a dispositive pre-trial motion and considering whether genuine issues of 
material fact exist, a trial court must apply the standard of proof that would be used for 
each element of the claim. See Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 262, 
264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). In other words, when a party is required to prove a claim by clear and 
convincing evidence at trial, the reviewing court must consider the claim under the clear 
and convincing evidence standard. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 800 
(Utah 1991). 
Mr. Nguyen could not, as a matter of law, satisfy the requirements for an award 
of punitive damages against PCMC under any evidentiary standard, much less under a 
clear and convincing evidentiary standard. No record evidence exists that PCMC acted 
willfully and maliciously in an intentionally fraudulent manner or with knowing and 
reckless disregard for his rights or the well-being of his son. The record does not support 
that PCMC or its employees acted willfully, maliciously, knowingly, recklessly, or in an 
intentionally fraudulent manner in treating Derek or advising Mr. Nguyen about Derek's 
treatment. 
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CONCLUSION 
PCMC respectfully requests this Court to affirm t|ie trial court's ruling on the 
motion to strike Mr. Nguyen's expert and on its motion foil summary judgment. Mr. 
Nguyen has not provided reliable expert testimony to establish that PCMC or its staff 
breached the standard of care owed to Derek. 
DATED this > day of April, 2009. 
S BRANDT FILLER NELSON 
IT G.WRIGHT 
BRANDON B. HOBBS 
ZACHARY E. PETERSON 
Cttorneys for Defendant!/Appellee, PCMC 
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